Cryptography and Embedded System Security CRAESS_I

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Course Outline

- Abstract algebra and number theory
- Introduction to cryptography
- Symmetric block ciphers and their implementations
- RSA, RSA signatures, and their implementations
- Probability theory and introduction to SCA
- SPA and non-profiled DPA
- Profiled DPA
- SCA countermeasures
- FA on RSA and countermeasures
- FA on symmetric block ciphers
- FA countermeasures for symmetric block cipher
- Practical aspects of physical attacks
 - Invited speaker: Dr. Jakub Breier, Senior security manager, TTControl GmbH

Recommended reading

- Textbook
 - Sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.5



Lecture Outline

- Introduction
- RSA
- RSA Signatures
- Implementations of Modular Exponentiation
- Implementations of Modular Multiplication

RSA, RSA signatures, and their implementations

• Introduction

- RSA
- RSA Signatures
- Implementations of Modular Exponentiation
- Implementations of Modular Multiplication

Insecure communication channel



src: https://pngtree.com/

Bob

src: https://alicebobstory.com/

Alice



src: https://www.pngwing.com/en/free-png-zhbsy

Cryptosystem

Definition

A cryptosystem is a tuple $(\mathfrak{P}, \mathfrak{C}, \mathfrak{K}, \mathfrak{E}, \mathfrak{D})$ with the following properties.

- \mathcal{P} is a finite set of plaintexts, called *plaintext space*.
- C is a finite set of ciphertexts, called *ciphertext space*.
- $\mathcal K$ is a finite set of keys, called *key space*.
- $\mathcal{E} = \{ E_k : k \in \mathcal{K} \}$, where $E_k : \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{C}$ is an *encryption function*.
- $\mathcal{D} = \{ D_k : k \in \mathcal{K} \}$, where $D_k : \mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{P}$ is a *decryption function*.
- For each $e \in \mathcal{K}$, there exists $d \in \mathcal{K}$ such that $D_d(E_e(p)) = p$ for all $p \in \mathcal{P}$.

If e = d, the cryptosystem is called a *symmetric key cryptosystem*. Otherwise, it is called a *public-key/asymmetric cryptosystem*.

Key exchange

- For symmetric key cipher, a prior communication of the master key (*key* exchange) is required before any ciphertext is transmitted.
- With only a symmetric key cipher, the key exchange may be difficult to achieve due to, e.g. far distance, and too many parties involved.
- In practice, this is where asymmetric key cryptosystem comes into use.
- For example, Alice would like to communicate with Bob using AES.
 - To exchange the master key, k, for AES, she will encrypt k by a public key cryptosystem using Bob's public key e, $c = E_e(k)$.
 - The resulting ciphertext c will be sent to Bob, and Bob can decrypt it with his secret private key d, $k = D_d(c)$.
 - Then Alice and Bob can communicate with key k using AES.

Security of public key cryptosystem

- Clearly, we require that it is computationally infeasible to find the private key d given the public key e.
- In practice, this is guaranteed by some intractable problem
 - A problem is intractable if there does not exist an efficient algorithm to solve it.
- However, the cipher might not be secure in the future.
 - For example, if a quantum computer with enough bits is manufactured, it can break many public key cryptosystems
- A public key cipher is not perfectly secure
 - perfectly secure: in a ciphertext-only attack setting, the attacker cannot obtain any information about the plaintext no matter how much computing power they have.
 - the attacker can brute force the key

Greatest common divisor

Definition

Take $m, n \in \mathbb{Z}$, $m \neq 0$ or $n \neq 0$, the greatest common divisor of m and n, denoted gcd(m, n), is given by $d \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that

- d > 0,
- d|m, d|n, and
- if c|m and c|n, then c|d.

Example

- All positive divisors of 4 and 6 are 1,2,4 and 1,2,3,6 respectively. So $\gcd(4,6)=2.$
- All the positive divisors of 2 are 1 and 2. All the positive divisors of 3 are 1 and 3. So gcd(2,3) = 1.

Bézout's identity

Theorem (Bézout's identity)

For any $m, n \in \mathbb{Z}$, such that $m \neq 0$ or $n \neq 0$. gcd(m, n) exists and is unique. Moreover, $\exists s, t \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that gcd(m, n) = sm + tn.

Example

$$gcd(4,6) = 2 = (-1) \times 4 + 1 \times 6.$$

$$gcd(2,3) = 1 = (-4) \times 2 + 3 \times 3.$$

Euclidean algorithm

Theorem (Euclid's division)

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Given m, n \in \mathbb{Z}, take q, r such that n = qm + r, then gcd(m, n) = gcd(m, r).
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Thus, to find $\gcd(m,n),$ we can compute Euclid's division repeatedly until we get r=0.

Example

We can calculate gcd(120, 35) as follows:

$$\begin{array}{ll} 120 = 35 \times 3 + 15 & \gcd(120, 35) = \gcd(35, 15), \\ 35 = 15 \times 2 + 5 & \gcd(35, 15) = \gcd(15, 5), \\ 15 = 5 \times 3 & \gcd(15, 5) = 5 \Longrightarrow \gcd(120, 35) = 5 \end{array}$$

Euclidean algorithm

Example

We can calculate $\gcd(160,21)$ using the Euclidean algorithm

$$\begin{array}{ll} 160 = 21 \times 7 + 13 & \gcd(160, 21) = \gcd(21, 13), \\ 21 = 13 \times 1 + 8 & \gcd(21, 13) = \gcd(13, 8), \\ 13 = 8 \times 1 + 5 & \gcd(13, 8) = \gcd(8, 5), \\ 8 = 5 \times 1 + 3 & \gcd(8, 5) = \gcd(5, 3), \\ 5 = 3 \times 1 + 2 & \gcd(5, 3) = \gcd(3, 2), \\ 3 = 2 \times 1 + 1 & \gcd(3, 2) = \gcd(2, 1), \\ 2 = 1 \times 2 & \gcd(2, 1) = 1 \Longrightarrow \gcd(160, 21) = 1 \end{array}$$

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Extended Euclidean algorithm

Note

With the intermediate results we have from the Euclidean algorithm, we can also find s, t such that gcd(m, n) = sm + tn (Bézout's identity).

Example

We have calculated gcd(120, 35) as follows:

$$\begin{array}{ll} 120 = 35 \times 3 + 15 & \gcd(120, 35) = \gcd(35, 15), \\ 35 = 15 \times 2 + 5 & \gcd(35, 15) = \gcd(15, 5), \\ 15 = 5 \times 3 & \gcd(15, 5) = 5 \Longrightarrow \gcd(120, 35) = 5. \end{array}$$

Then

$$\begin{split} 5 &= 35 - 15 \times 2, \\ 15 &= 120 - 35 \times 3, \\ 5 &= 35 - (120 - 35 \times 3) \times 2 = 120 \times (-2) + 35 \times 7. \end{split}$$

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Extended Euclidean algorithm

Example

We have calculated $\gcd(160,21)$ using the Euclidean algorithm

$$\begin{array}{ll} 160 = 21 \times 7 + 13 & \gcd(160, 21) = \gcd(21, 13), \\ 21 = 13 \times 1 + 8 & \gcd(21, 13) = \gcd(13, 8), \\ 13 = 8 \times 1 + 5 & \gcd(13, 8) = \gcd(8, 5), \\ 8 = 5 \times 1 + 3 & \gcd(8, 5) = \gcd(6, 5), \\ 5 = 3 \times 1 + 2 & \gcd(5, 3) = \gcd(3, 2), \\ 3 = 2 \times 1 + 1 & \gcd(3, 2) = \gcd(2, 1), \\ 2 = 1 \times 2 & \gcd(2, 1) = 1 \Longrightarrow \gcd(160, 21) = 1 \end{array}$$

Using the extended Euclidean algorithm, find integers s,t such that $\gcd(160,21)=s160+t35$

Extended Euclidean algorithm

Example

By the extended Euclidean algorithm,

$$\begin{array}{ll} 1 = 3 - 2, & 2 = 5 - 3, \\ 3 = 8 - 5, & 5 = 13 - 8, \\ 8 = 21 - 13, & 13 = 160 - 21 \times 7. \end{array}$$

We have

$$1 = 3 - (5 - 3) = 3 \times 2 - 5 = 8 \times 2 - 5 \times 3 = 8 \times 2 - (13 - 8) \times 3$$

= 8 \times 5 - 13 \times 3 = 21 \times 5 - 13 \times 8 = 21 \times 5 - (160 - 21 \times 7) \times 8
= (-8) \times 160 + 61 \times 21.

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Prime numbers

Definition

- For $m, n \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $m \neq 0$ or $n \neq 0$, m and n are said to be *relatively prime/coprime* if gcd(m, n) = 1.
- Given $p \in \mathbb{Z}$, p > 1. p is said to be *prime* (or a *prime number*) if for any $m \in \mathbb{Z}$, either m is a multiple of p (i.e. p|m) or m and p are coprime (i.e. gcd(p,m) = 1).

Example

- 4 and 9 are relatively prime
- 8 and 6 are not relatively prime
- 2, 3, 5, 7 are prime numbers
- 6, 9, 21 are not prime numbers

The Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic

Theorem (The Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic) For any $n \in \mathbb{Z}$, n > 1, n can be written in the form

$$n = \prod_{i=1}^{k} p_i^{e_i},$$

where the exponents e_i are positive, the prime numbers p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_k are pairwise distinct and unique up to permutation.

Example

$$20 = 2^2 \times 5$$
, $135 = 3^3 \times 5$.

Congruence class

Definition

For any $a \in \mathbb{Z}$, the congruence class of a modulo n, denoted \overline{a} , is given by

$$\overline{a} := \{ b \mid b \in \mathbb{Z}, b \equiv a \mod n \}.$$

Lemma

Let \mathbb{Z}_n denote the set of all congruence classes of $a \in \mathbb{Z}$ modulo n. Then $\mathbb{Z}_n = \{\overline{0}, \overline{1}, \dots, \overline{n-1}\}.$

Example

Let n = 5. We have $\overline{1} = \overline{6} = \overline{-4}$. $\mathbb{Z}_5 = \{\overline{0}, \overline{1}, \overline{2}, \overline{3}, \overline{4}\}.$

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Addition and multiplication in \mathbb{Z}_n

Define addition on the set \mathbb{Z}_n as follows:

$$\overline{a} + \overline{b} = \overline{a+b}.$$

Example

- Let n = 7, $\overline{3} + \overline{2} = \overline{5}$.
- Let n = 4, $\overline{2} + \overline{2} = \overline{4} = \overline{0}$.

Define multiplication on \mathbb{Z}_n as follows

$$\overline{a} \cdot \overline{b} = \overline{ab}.$$

Example

Let n = 5,

$$\overline{-2} \cdot \overline{13} = \overline{3} \cdot \overline{3} = \overline{9} = \overline{4}$$

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Theorem

 $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +, \cdot)$, the set \mathbb{Z}_n together with addition multiplication defined just now is a commutative ring.

Remark

For simplicity, we write a instead of \overline{a} and to make sure there is no confusion we would first say $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$. In particular, $\mathbb{Z}_n = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, n-1\}$. Furthermore, to emphasize that multiplication or addition is done in \mathbb{Z}_n , we write $ab \mod n$ or $a + b \mod n$.

Example

Let n = 5, we write

$$4 \times 2 \mod 5 = 8 \mod 5 = 3$$
, or $4 \times 2 \equiv 8 \equiv 3 \mod 5$.

Lemma

For any $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, $a \neq 0$, a has a multiplicative inverse, denoted $a^{-1} \mod n$, if and only if gcd(a, n) = 1.

Corollary

 \mathbb{Z}_n is a field if and only if n is prime.

Find multiplicative inverse in \mathbb{Z}_n

• Recall that by the extended Euclidean algorithm, we can find integers $\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{t}$ such that

$$gcd(a,n) = sa + tn$$

for any $a, n \in \mathbb{Z}$.

- In particular, when gcd(a, n) = 1, we can find s, t such that 1 = as + tn, which gives $as \mod n = 1$.
- Thus, we can find $a^{-1} \mod n = s \mod n$ by the extended Euclidean algorithm.

Example – Find multiplicative inverse in \mathbb{Z}_n

Example

We have calculated $\gcd(160,21)=1$ using the Euclidean algorithm. By the extended Euclidean algorithm,

$$1 = 3 - 2, \qquad 2 = 5 - 3, \\3 = 8 - 5, \qquad 5 = 13 - 8, \\8 = 21 - 13, \qquad 13 = 160 - 21 \times 7.$$

We have

$$1 = 3 - (5 - 3) = 3 \times 2 - 5 = 8 \times 2 - 5 \times 3 = 8 \times 2 - (13 - 8) \times 3$$

= 8 \times 5 - 13 \times 3 = 21 \times 5 - 13 \times 8 = 21 \times 5 - (160 - 21 \times 7) \times 8
= (-8) \times 160 + 61 \times 21.

Thus

$$21^{-1} \mod 160 = 61.$$

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Definition

Let \mathbb{Z}_n^* denote the set of congruence classes in \mathbb{Z}_n which have multiplicative inverses:

$$\mathbb{Z}_n^* := \{ a \mid a \in \mathbb{Z}_n, \ \gcd(a, n) = 1 \}.$$

Let $\varphi(n)$ denote the cardinality of \mathbb{Z}_n^*

$$\varphi(n) = |\mathbb{Z}_n^*|.$$

 φ is called the Euler's totient function.

Example

• Let n = 3, $\mathbb{Z}_3^* = \{ 1, 2 \}$, $\varphi(3) = 2$.

• Let
$$n = 4$$
, $\mathbb{Z}_4^* = \{ 1, 3 \}$, $\varphi(4) = 2$.

• Let n = p be a prime number, $\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \mathbb{Z}_p - \{0\} = \{1, 2, \dots, p-1\}, \varphi(p) = p-1.$

Euler's totient function

Theorem

For any $n \in \mathbb{Z}$, n > 1,

if
$$n = \prod_{i=1}^{k} p_i^{e_i}$$
, then $\varphi(n) = n \prod_{i=1}^{k} \left(1 - \frac{1}{p_i}\right)$, (1)

where p_i are distinct primes.

Example

• Let n = 10. $10 = 2 \times 5$. We can count the elements in \mathbb{Z}_{10} that are coprime to 10 (there are 4 of them): $\mathbb{Z}_{10} = \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9\}$. By the above theorem we also have

$$\varphi(10) = 10 \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{2}\right) \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{5}\right) = 4.$$

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Euler's totient function

Theorem

For any $n \in \mathbb{Z}$, n > 1,

$$\textit{if} \quad n = \prod_{i=1}^k p_i^{e_i}, \quad \textit{then} \quad \varphi(n) = n \prod_{i=1}^k \left(1 - \frac{1}{p_i}\right),$$

where p_i are distinct primes.

Example

• Let n = 120. $120 = 2^3 \times 3 \times 5$.

 $\varphi(120) = ?$

• Let n = pq, where p and q are two distinct primes. Then

 $\varphi(n) = ?$

(2)

Euler's totient function

Example

• Let
$$n = 120$$
. $120 = 2^3 \times 3 \times 5$.

$$\varphi(120) = 120 \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{2}\right) \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{3}\right) \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{5}\right) = 32.$$

• Let n = pq, where p and q are two distinct primes. Then

$$\varphi(n) = pq\left(1 - \frac{1}{p}\right)\left(1 - \frac{1}{q}\right) = (p-1)(q-1).$$

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RSA, RSA signatures, and their implementations

- Introduction
- RSA
- RSA Signatures
- Implementations of Modular Exponentiation
- Implementations of Modular Multiplication

RSA

- Published in 1977
- Named after its inventors Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman.
- RSA is the first public key cryptosystem, and still in use today.
- The security relies on the difficulty of finding the factorization of a composite positive integer.

Definition

Definition (RSA)

Let n = pq, where p, q are distinct prime numbers. Let $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{C} = \mathbb{Z}_n$, $\mathcal{K} = \mathbb{Z}_{\varphi(n)}^* - \{1\}$. For any $e \in \mathcal{K}$, define encryption

$$E_e: \mathbb{Z}_n \to \mathbb{Z}_n, \quad m \mapsto m^e \mod n,$$

and the corresponding decryption

$$D_d: \mathbb{Z}_n \to \mathbb{Z}_n, \quad c \mapsto c^d \mod n,$$

where $d = e^{-1} \mod \varphi(n)$. The cryptosystem $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$, where $\mathcal{E} = \{ E_e : e \in \mathcal{K} \}, \mathcal{D} = \{ D_d : d \in \mathcal{K} \}$, is called *RSA*.

•
$$\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$$

- Public key: n, e, RSA modulus, encryption exponent
- Private key: d, decryption exponent

Key generation

- Generate randomly and independently two large prime numbers $p \mbox{ and } q.$
- Compute n = pq.
 - Normally p and q are supposed to have equal lengths.
 - For example, take p and q to be 512-bit primes, and n will be a 1024-bit modulus.
- Choose $e \in \mathbb{Z}^*_{\varphi(n)}$
 - Note that e is odd since $\varphi(n)$ is even
 - In practice, e is chosen to be small to make the encryption efficient.
 - However, e cannot be too small. It has been shown that only the n/4 least significant bits of d suffice to recover d in the case of a small e
- Compute $d = e^{-1} \mod \varphi(n)$ (extended Euclidean algorithm)
 - d cannot be too small, it was proven that if $d < n^{0.292}$, then RSA can be broken

Example

- As a toy example, suppose Bob would like to generate his private and public keys for RSA.
- Bob randomly generates p = 3 and q = 5.
- Then he computes n = 15 and

$$\varphi(n) = 1$$
$$\mathbb{Z}^*_{\varphi(n)} = 1$$

Example

- As a toy example, suppose Bob would like to generate his private and public keys for RSA.
- Bob randomly generates p = 3 and q = 5.
- Then he computes n = 15 and

$$\varphi(n) = 2 \times 4 = 8.$$

$$\mathbb{Z}_{\varphi(n)}^* = \{ 1, 3, 5, 7 \}$$

- From \mathbb{Z}_8^* , Bob chooses e = 3.
- Then by the extended Euclidean algorithm, he computes

$$d = 3^{-1} \mod 8 = ?$$

Example

- p = 3, q = 5, n = 15 and $\varphi(n) = 2 \times 4 = 8$.
- From $\mathbb{Z}_8^* = \{ 1, 3, 5, 7 \}$, Bob chooses e = 3.
- Then by the extended Euclidean algorithm, he computes

 $8 = 3 \times 2 + 2, \ 3 = 2 \times 1 + 1 \Longrightarrow 1 = 3 - 2 \times 1 = 3 - (8 - 3 \times 2) = -8 + 3 \times 3.$

- Hence his private key $d = 3^{-1} \mod 8 = 3$.
- Suppose Alice would like to send plaintext m=2 to Bob, using Bob's public key n=15, e=3.
- Alice computes

$$c = m^e \mod n = ?$$

• After receiving the ciphertext \boldsymbol{c} from Alice, Bob computes the plaintext using his private key

$$m = c^d \mod n = ?$$

Example

$$p = 3$$
, $q = 5$, $n = 15$, $\varphi(n) = 2 \times 4 = 8$, $e = 3$, $d = 3^{-1} \mod 8 = 3$.

- Suppose Alice would like to send plaintext m = 2 to Bob, using Bob's public key n = 15, e = 3.
- Alice computes

$$c = m^e \mod n = 2^3 \mod 15 = 8.$$

• After receiving the ciphertext c from Alice, Bob computes the plaintext using his private key

$$m = c^d \mod n = 8^3 \mod 15 = 512 \mod 15 = 2.$$


Example

$$p = 29, \quad q = 41, \quad n = 1189$$

 $\varphi(n) = ?$

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Example

$$p = 29, \quad q = 41, \quad n = 1189.$$

 $\varphi(n) = 28 \times 40 = 1120.$

It is easy to verify that $3 \nmid \varphi(n).$ And we choose e=3. By the extended Euclidean algorithm

$$d = e^{-1} \mod \varphi(n) = ?.$$

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Example

$$p = 29, \quad q = 41, \quad n = 1189, \quad \varphi(n) = 28 \times 40 = 1120, \quad e = 3.$$

By the extended Euclidean algorithm

$$1120 = 3 \times 373 + 1 \Longrightarrow 1 = 1120 - 3 \times 373.$$

 $d = -373 \mod 1120 = 747.$

To send plaintext m = 2 to Bob. Alice computes

 $c = m^e \mod n = ?$

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Example

$$p = 29, \quad q = 41, \quad n = 1189, \quad \varphi(n) = 1120, \quad e = 3, \quad d = -373 \mod 1120 = 747.$$

To send plaintext m = 2 to Bob. Alice computes

$$c = m^e \mod n = 2^3 \mod 1189 = 8 \mod 1189.$$

To decrypt, Bob computes

$$m = c^d \mod n = 8^{747} \mod 1189$$

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Example

To decrypt, Bob computes $m = c^d \mod n = 8^{747} \mod 1189$. Since 747 = 512 + 128 + 64 + 32 + 8 + 2 + 1,

 $\begin{array}{ll} 8^4 \mod 1189 = 4096 \mod 1189 = 529, \\ 8^{16} \mod 1189 = 426^2 \mod 1189 = 748, \\ 8^{64} \mod 1189 = 674^2 \mod 1189 = 78, \\ 8^{256} \mod 1189 = 139^2 \mod 1189 = 297, \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{ll} 8^8 \mod 1189 = 529^2 \mod 1189 = 426, \\ 8^{32} \mod 1189 = 748^2 \mod 1189 = 674, \\ 8^{128} \mod 1189 = 78^2 \mod 1189 = 139, \\ 8^{512} \mod 1189 = 297^2 \mod 1189 = 223. \end{array}$

$$\begin{split} 8^{512+128} \mod 1189 &= 223 \times 139 \mod 1189 = 83, \\ 8^{64+32} \mod 1189 &= 78 \times 674 \mod 1189 = 256 \\ 8^{8+2+1} \mod 1189 &= 426 \times 64 \times 8 \mod 1189 = 525, \\ 8^{747} \mod 1189 &= 83 \times 256 \times 525 \mod 1189 = 2. \end{split}$$

A useful lemma

To understand why the decryption works, let us first look at a lemma:

Lemma

Let p be a prime. Then for any $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $b \equiv c \mod (p-1)$, we have

$$a^b \equiv a^c \mod p$$

In particular,

$$a^b \equiv a^b \mod (p-1) \mod p.$$

Example

Let
$$p = 5$$
, $a = 2$, $b = 6$. Then $2^6 \equiv ? \mod 5$.

A useful lemma

Lemma

Let p be a prime. Then for any $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $b \equiv c \mod (p-1)$, we have

 $a^b \equiv a^c \mod p.$

In particular,

$$a^b \equiv a^b \mod (p-1) \mod p.$$

Example

Let p = 5, a = 2, b = 6. Then

$$2^6 \equiv 2^6 \mod 4 \equiv 2^2 \equiv 4 \mod 5.$$

We can verify that indeed

 $2^6 \equiv 64 \equiv 4 \mod 5.$

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Why decryption works

By the choice of e and d,

$$ed \equiv 1 \mod \varphi(n) \Longrightarrow ed = \varphi(n)a + 1$$
 for some $a \in \mathbb{Z}$.

Then

$$c^{d} = (m^{e})^{d} = m^{\varphi(n)a+1} = m^{(p-1)(q-1)a}m.$$

By the lemma above:

$$c^d \equiv m \mod p, \quad c^d \equiv m \mod q.$$

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Chinese Remainder Theorem

Theorem (Chinese Remainder Theorem)

Let m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_k be pairwise coprime integers. For any $a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_k \in \mathbb{Z}$, the system of simultaneous congruences

 $x \equiv a_1 \mod m_1, \quad x \equiv a_2 \mod m_2, \quad \dots \quad x \equiv a_k \mod m_k$

has a unique solution modulo $m = \prod_{i=1}^{k} m_i$.

Example

Take two distinct primes p, q, and let n = pq. By CRT, for any $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, there is a unique solution $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ such that

$$x \equiv a \mod p, \quad x \equiv a \mod q.$$

Since $a \equiv a \mod p$ and $a \equiv a \mod q$, the unique solution is given by $x = a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$.

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Why decryption works

By the choice of e and d,

$$ed \equiv 1 \mod \varphi(n) \Longrightarrow ed = \varphi(n)a + 1$$
 for some $a \in \mathbb{Z}$.

Then

$$c^{d} = (m^{e})^{d} = m^{\varphi(n)a+1} = m^{(p-1)(q-1)a}m.$$

By the lemma above:

$$c^d \equiv m \mod p, \quad c^d \equiv m \mod q.$$

By Chinese Remainder Theorem,

 $c^d \equiv m \mod n.$

Security of RSA

- If p or q is known to the attacker
 - can factorize n and compute $\varphi(n)$
 - with e, d can be computed using the extended Euclidean algorithm
- All $p, q, \varphi(n)$ should be kept secret
- Of course, if the attacker can factorize n with an efficient algorithm, then RSA is broken.
 - Up to now, the best-known algorithm for integer factorization has been used to factorize RSA modulus of bit length 768
 - In practice, the most commonly used RSA modulus n is 1024, 2048, or 4096 bit.
 - On the other hand, there is no proof that factorizing an integer n is infeasible.
- It is not proven that RSA is secure if factoring is computationally infeasible there might be other ways to attack RSA.

RSA, RSA signatures, and their implementations

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Digital signatures

- Digital signatures provide means for an entity to bind its identity to a message.
- This normally means that the sender uses their private key to sign the (hashed) message.
- Whoever has access to the public key can then verify the origin of the message.
- For example, the message can be electronic contracts or electronic bank transactions.
- Suppose Alice signs a message m with a private key d and generates signature s.
- Bob receives the message and the signature, he can then verify *s* with public key *e* and a *verification algorithm*.
- Given m and s, the verification algorithm returns true to indicate a valid signature and false otherwise.

RSA signatures

- To use RSA for digital signature, we again let p and q be two distinct primes.
- n = pq, choose $e \in \mathbb{Z}^*_{\varphi(n)}$, compute $d = e^{-1} \mod \varphi(n)$.
- The public key consists of e and n.
- *d* is the private key.
- p, q and $\varphi(n)$ should be kept secret.

RSA signatures

To sign a message m, Alice computes the signature

 $s = m^d \mod n.$

Then Alice sends both m and s to Bob. To verify the signature, Bob computes

 $s^e \mod n$.

If $s \equiv m \mod n$, then the verification algorithm outputs true, and false otherwise.

• Up to now, the only method known to compute s from $m \mod n$ is using d, so if the verification algorithm outputs true, Bob can conclude that Alice is the owner of d.

Example

Alice chooses p = 5 and q = 7. Then n = 35 and

 $\varphi(n) = ?.$

Example

- Alice chooses p = 5 and q = 7.
- Then

$$n = 35, \quad \varphi(n) = 24$$

- Suppose Alice chooses e = 5, which is coprime to 24.
- By the extended Euclidean algorithm

$$d = e^{-1} \mod \varphi(n) = ?$$

Example

$$p = 5, \quad q = 7, \quad n = 35, \quad \varphi(n) = 24, \quad e = 5.$$

• By the extended Euclidean algorithm

$$24 = 5 \times 4 + 4, \ 5 = 4 + 1 \Longrightarrow 1 = 5 - (24 - 5 \times 4) = 24 \times (-1) + 5 \times 5,$$

we have $d = e^{-1} \mod 24 = 5$.

• To sign message m = 10, Alice computes

$$s = m^d \mod n = ?$$

- Alice sends both the message and signature to Bob.
- Bob verifies the signature

$$s^e \mod n = ?$$

Example

$$p = 5, \quad q = 7, \quad n = 35, \quad \varphi(n) = 24, \quad e = 5, \quad d = 5$$

• To sign message m = 10, Alice computes

$$s = m^d \mod n = 10^5 \mod 35 = 5.$$

- Alice sends both the message m = 10 and signature s = 5 to Bob.
- Bob verifies the signature

$$s^e \mod n = 5^5 \mod 35 = 10 = m.$$

Forgery attack on RSA signatures

- The most common attack for a digital signature is to create a valid signature for a message without knowing the secret key.
- Such an attack is called *forgery*
- Suppose the attacker, Eve, knows messages m_1, m_2 and their corresponding signatures s_1 and s_2 .
- Eve computes $s = s_1 s_2 \mod n$ and $m = m_1 m_2 \mod n$.
- Since

$$s = m_1^d m_2^d \mod n = (m_1 m_2)^d \mod n = m^d \mod n,$$

s is a valid signature for m.

• RSA signatures are commonly used together with a fast public hash function h

Hash functions

- Hash functions map data of arbitrary length to a binary array of some fixed length called *hash values* or *message digests*
- The following are the properties that should be met in a properly designed cryptographic hash function:
 - (a) it is quick to compute a hash-value for any given input;
 - (b) it is computationally infeasible to generate an input that yields a given hash value (a preimage);
 - (c) it is computationally infeasible to find a second input that maps to the same hash value when one input is already known (a second preimage);
 - (d) it is computationally infeasible to find any pair of different messages that produce the same hash value (a collision).

RSA signature with hash function

• To sign a message *m*, Alice computes the signature

 $s = h(m)^d \mod n.$

- Then she sends both m and s to Bob.
- Bob computes $s^e \mod n$ and h(m).
- If $s^e \mod n = h(m)$, then Bob concludes the signature is valid.

Forgery attack

• Suppose the attacker, Eve, knows messages m_1, m_2 and their corresponding signatures s_1 and s_2 .

Without hash function

• Eve computes $s = s_1 s_2 \mod n$ and $m = m_1 m_2 \mod n$.

Since

$$s = m_1^d m_2^d \mod n = (m_1 m_2)^d \mod n = m^d \mod n,$$

s is a valid signature for m.

With hash function

- She can compute $h(m_1)$ and $h(m_2)$ as h is public.
- However, to repeat the forgery attack, she needs to find m such that $h(m) = h(m_1)h(m_2)$, which is computationally infeasible according to property (b) of hash functions

RSA, RSA signatures, and their implementations

- Introduction
- RSA
- RSA Signatures
- Implementations of Modular Exponentiation
- Implementations of Modular Multiplication

Modular exponentiation

- To implement RSA or RSA signatures, we need to compute $a^d \mod n$ for some integer $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$,
- n = pq is a product of two distinct primes and d ∈ Z^{*}_{φ(n)}.
- We can compute d-1 modular multiplications.
 - inefficient for large \boldsymbol{d}
 - impossible for practical values of d bit length more than 1000
- Two methods
 - square and multiply algorithm
 - CRT-based RSA implementation

Square and multiply algorithm

- Let $n \geq 2$ be an integer, $d \in \mathbb{Z}_{\varphi(n)}$, $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$
- Binary representation of $d = d_{\ell_d-1} \dots d_2 d_1 d_0$, where $d_i = 0, 1$ and

$$d = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell_d - 1} d_i 2^i.$$

• We have $a^d = a^{\sum_{i=0}^{\ell_d - 1} d_i 2^i} = \prod_{i=0}^{\ell_d - 1} (a^{2^i})^{d_i} = \prod_{0 \leq i < \ell_d, d_i = 1} a^{2^i}.$

- Thus, to compute $a^d \mod n$, we can
 - First compute a^{2^i} for $0 \le i < \ell_d$
 - Then a^d is a product of a^{2^i} for which $d_i = 1$
- Compared to d-1 modular multiplications, this requires at most $2\log_2 d$ multiplications

Square and multiply algorithm

Algorithm 1: Right-to-left square and multiply algorithm for computing modular exponentiation

Input: $n, a, d// n \in \mathbb{Z}, n \geq 2; a \in \mathbb{Z}_n; d \in \mathbb{Z}_{\omega(n)}$ has bit length ℓ_d **Output:** $a^d \mod n$ 1 result = 1. t = a2 for i = 0, $i < \ell_d$, i + i// ith bit of d is 1 3 if $d_i = 1$ then 4 if $d_i = 1$ then // mutiply by a^{2^i} result = result * $t \mod n//a^d = \prod$ $0 \le i \le \ell_d \cdot d_i = 1$ 5 $t = t * t \mod n$

6 return result

1 result = 1, t = a2 for i = 0, $i < \ell_d$, i + + do 3 $| \begin{array}{c} // ith bit of d is 1 \\ if d_i = 1$ then 4 $| \begin{array}{c} // mutiply by a^{2^i} \\ result = result * t \mod n \\ // t = a^{2^{i+1}} \\ t = t * t \mod n \end{array}$

6 return result

Example

Let $n = 15, d = 3 = 11_2, a = 2$. Then

 $a^d \mod n = 2^3 \mod 15 = 8 \mod 15 = 8$

i	d_i	t	result
0	?	?	?
1	?	?	?

1 result = 1, t = a2 for i = 0, $i < \ell_d$, i + + do | // ith bit of d is 1 $| if d_i = 1$ then $| // mutiply by a^{2^i}$ $| // t = a^{2^{i+1}}$ $t = t * t \mod n$

6 return result

Example

Let $n = 15, d = 3 = 11_2, a = 2$. Then

 $a^d \mod n = 2^3 \mod 15 = 8 \mod 15 = 8$

i	d_i	t	result
0	1	4	2
1	1	1	8

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1 result = 1, t = a2 for i = 0, $i < \ell_d$, i + + do 3 $| \begin{array}{c} // ith bit of d is 1 \\ if d_i = 1$ then 4 $| \begin{array}{c} // mutiply by a^{2^i} \\ result = result * t mod n \\ // t = a^{2^{i+1}} \\ 5 & t = t * t mod n \end{array}$

6 return result

Example

Let n = 23, $d = 4 = 100_2$, a = 5. Then

 $a^d \mod n = 5^4 \mod 23 = 625 \mod 23 = 4$

i	d_i	t	result
0	?	?	?
1	?	?	?
2	?	?	?

1 result = 1, t = a2 for i = 0, $i < \ell_d$, i + + do 3 $| \begin{array}{c} // ith bit of d is 1 \\ if d_i = 1$ then 4 $| \begin{array}{c} // mutiply by a^{2^i} \\ result = result * t mod n \\ // t = a^{2^{i+1}} \\ 5 & t = t * t mod n \end{array}$

6 return result

Example

Let n = 23, $d = 4 = 100_2$, a = 5. Then

 $a^d \mod n = 5^4 \mod 23 = 625 \mod 23 = 4$

i	d_i	t	result
0	0	2	1
1	0	4	1
2	1	16	4

Algorithm 2: Left-to-right square and multiply algorithm for computing modular exponentiation.

```
\begin{array}{c|c} \text{Input: } n, \ a, \ d// \ n \in \mathbb{Z}, n \ge 2; \ a \in \mathbb{Z}_n; \ d \in \mathbb{Z}_{\varphi(n)} \\ \textbf{Output: } a^d \mod n \\ 1 \ t = 1 \\ 2 \ \text{for } i = \ell_d - 1, \ i \ge 0, \ i - - \ \text{do} \\ 3 & t = t * t \mod n \\ 1 & t = t * t \mod n \\ 1 & t = t + t \mod n \\ 1 & t = 1 \\ 1
```

6 return t

1
$$\overline{t = 1}$$

2 for $i = \ell_d - 1$, $i \ge 0$, $i - -do$
3 $t = t * t \mod n$
4 $if d_i = 1$ then
5 $t = a * t \mod n$
6 return t

Example

Let $n = 15, d = 3 = 11_2, a = 2$. Then

 $a^d \mod n = 2^3 \mod 15 = 8 \mod 15 = 8$

i	d_i	t
1	?	?
0	?	?

1
$$\overline{t = 1}$$

2 for $i = \ell_d - 1$, $i \ge 0$, $i - -do$
3 $t = t * t \mod n$
4 $if d_i = 1$ then
5 $t = a * t \mod n$
6 return t

Example

Let $n = 15, d = 3 = 11_2, a = 2$. Then

 $a^d \mod n = 2^3 \mod 15 = 8 \mod 15 = 8$

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1
$$\overline{t = 1}$$

2 for $i = \ell_d - 1$, $i \ge 0$, $i - -do$
3 $t = t * t \mod n$
4 $if d_i = 1$ then
5 $t = a * t \mod n$
6 roturn t

Example Let n = 23, $d = 4 = 100_2$, a = 5. Then $a^d \mod n = 5^4 \mod 23 = 625 \mod 23 = 4$

1
$$\overline{t = 1}$$

2 for $i = \ell_d - 1$, $i \ge 0$, $i - -do$
3 $t = t * t \mod n$
4 $if d_i = 1$ then
5 $t = a * t \mod n$
6 roturn t

6 return t

Example Let n = 23, $d = 4 = 100_2$, a = 5. Then $a^d \mod n = 5^4 \mod 23 = 625 \mod 23 = 4$ $\frac{i \quad d_i \quad t}{2 \quad 1 \quad 5}$ $\frac{1 \quad 0 \quad 2}{0 \quad 0 \quad 4}$
CRT-based

- p, q: distinct primes
- n = pq is the RSA modulus
- $d\in\mathbb{Z}^*_{arphi(n)}$ is the private key for RSA or RSA signatures.

Chinese Remainder Theorem

Theorem (Chinese Remainder Theorem)

Let m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_k be pairwise coprime integers. For any $a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_k \in \mathbb{Z}$, the system of simultaneous congruences

 $x \equiv a_1 \mod m_1, \quad x \equiv a_2 \mod m_2, \quad \dots \quad x \equiv a_k \mod m_k$

has a unique solution modulo $m = \prod_{i=1}^{k} m_i$.

Example

Take two distinct primes p, q, and let n = pq. By CRT, for any $a \in \mathbb{Z}$, there is a unique solution $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ such that

 $x \equiv a \mod p, \quad x \equiv a \mod q.$

 \implies to find solution for $x \equiv a^d \mod n$ is equivalent to solving

$$x \equiv a^d \mod p, \quad x \equiv a^d \mod q.$$

A useful lemma

Lemma

Let p be a prime. Then for any $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $b \equiv c \mod (p-1)$, we have

 $a^b \equiv a^c \mod p.$

In particular,

$$a^b \equiv a^b \mod (p-1) \mod p.$$

Example

Let p = 5, a = 2, b = 6. Then

$$2^6 \equiv 2^6 \mod 4 \equiv 2^2 \equiv 4 \mod 5.$$

We can verify that indeed

 $2^6 \equiv 64 \equiv 4 \mod 5.$

CRT-based

By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, finding the solution for $x\equiv a^d \mod n$ is equivalent to solving

$$x \equiv a^d \mod p, \quad x \equiv a^d \mod q.$$

By the lemma, we can compute

$$x_p := a^{d \mod (p-1)} \mod p, \quad x_q := a^{d \mod (q-1)} \mod q,$$

and solve for

$$x \equiv x_p \mod p, \quad x \equiv x_q \mod q.$$

An implementation that computes $a^d \mod n$ by solving the above equation is called *CRT-based RSA*.

Gauss's algorithm

We have discussed in week 1 that, we can compute

$$M_q = q, \ M_p = p, \ y_q = M_q^{-1} \mod p = q^{-1} \mod p, \ y_p = M_p^{-1} \mod q = p^{-1} \mod q,$$

and

$$x = x_p y_q q + x_q y_p p \mod n$$

gives us the solution to

$$x \equiv x_p \mod p, \quad x \equiv x_q \mod q.$$

Calculating x by with this method is called the *Gauss's algorithm*.

Garner's algorithm

Garner's algorithm calculates

$$x = x_p + ((x_q - x_p)y_p \mod q)p.$$

This indeed gives the solution to

$$x \equiv x_p \mod p, \quad x \equiv x_q \mod q.$$

Firstly, it is straightforward to see $x \equiv x_p \mod p$. Furthermore,

$$x \equiv x_p + (x_q - x_p) \equiv x_q \mod q.$$

Since $x_p \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, $x_p < p$. Similarly, $(x_q - x_p)y_p \mod q \le q - 1$. And $x = x_p + ((x_q - x_p)y_p \mod q)p ,$

thus $x \in \mathbb{Z}_n$.

CRT-based RSA implementation

$$\begin{aligned} x_p &:= a^{d \mod (p-1)} \mod p, \quad x_q := a^{d \mod (q-1)} \mod q, \\ M_q &= q, \quad M_p = p \\ y_q &= M_q^{-1} \mod p = q^{-1} \mod p, \quad y_p = M_p^{-1} \mod q = p^{-1} \mod q. \end{aligned}$$

Example

$$p = 3, \quad q = 5, \quad n = 15, \quad \varphi(n) = 8, \quad e = 3, \quad d = 3, \quad m = 2, \quad c = 8$$

After receiving the ciphertext c, Bob computes the plaintext using his private key

$$m = c^d \mod n = 8^3 \mod 15 = 512 \mod 15 = 2 \mod 15$$

With CRT-based RSA implementation, Bob computes

$$m_p = ? \quad m_q = ? \quad y_p = ? \quad y_q = ?$$

Example

$$p = 3, \quad q = 5, \quad n = 15, \quad \varphi(n) = 8, \quad e = 3, \quad d = 3, \quad m = 2, \quad c = 8$$

After receiving the ciphertext c, with CRT-based RSA implementation, Bob computes

$$m_p = c^{d \mod (p-1)} \mod p = 8^{3 \mod 2} \mod 3 = 8 \mod 3 = 2,$$

$$m_q = c^{d \mod (q-1)} \mod q = 8^{3 \mod 4} \mod 5 = 512 \mod 5 = 2.$$

By the extended Euclidean algorithm,

$$5 = 3 \times 1 + 2, \ 3 = 2 + 1 \Longrightarrow 1 = 3 - (5 - 3) = 3 \times 2 - 5.$$

Thus

$$y_p = p^{-1} \mod q = 3^{-1} \mod 5 = 2 \mod 5,$$

$$y_q = q^{-1} \mod p = 5^{-1} \mod 3 = -1 \mod 3 = 2 \mod 3.$$

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Gauss's algorithm

 $x = x_p y_q q + x_q y_p p \mod n$

Example

$$p = 3, \quad q = 5, \quad n = 15, \quad \varphi(n) = 8, \quad e = 3, \quad d = 3, \quad c = 8$$

With CRT-based RSA implementation, Bob computes

$$m_p = 2 \quad m_q = 2 \quad y_p = 2 \quad y_q = 2.$$

By Gauss's algorithm

$$m = ?$$

Gauss's algorithm

 $x = x_p y_q q + x_q y_p p \mod n$

Example

$$p = 3, \quad q = 5, \quad n = 15, \quad \varphi(n) = 8, \quad e = 3, \quad d = 3, \quad m = 2, \quad c = 8$$

With CRT-based RSA implementation, Bob computes

$$m_p = 2 \quad m_q = 2 \quad y_p = 2 \quad y_q = 2.$$

By Gauss's algorithm

 $m = m_p y_q q + m_q y_p p \mod n = 2 \times 2 \times 5 + 2 \times 2 \times 3 \mod 15 = 32 \mod 15 = 2.$

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Garner's algorithm

$$x = x_p + ((x_q - x_p)y_p \mod q)p.$$

Example

$$p = 3, \quad q = 5, \quad n = 15, \quad \varphi(n) = 8, \quad e = 3, \quad d = 3, \quad c = 8$$

With CRT-based RSA implementation, Bob computes

$$m_p = 2 \quad m_q = 2 \quad y_p = 2 \quad y_q = 2.$$

By Garner's algorithm

$$m = ?$$

Garner's algorithm

$$x = x_p + ((x_q - x_p)y_p \mod q)p.$$

Example

$$p = 3, \quad q = 5, \quad n = 15, \quad \varphi(n) = 8, \quad e = 3, \quad d = 3, \quad c = 8$$

With CRT-based RSA implementation, Bob computes

$$m_p = 2 \quad m_q = 2 \quad y_p = 2 \quad y_q = 2.$$

By Garner's algorithm

$$m = m_p + ((m_q - m_p)y_p \mod q)p = 2 + 0 = 2.$$

CRT-based RSA implementation

$$\begin{aligned} x_p &:= a^{d \mod (p-1)} \mod p, \qquad x_q := a^{d \mod (q-1)} \mod q, \\ M_q &= q, \quad M_p = p, \\ y_q &= M_q^{-1} \mod p = q^{-1} \mod p, \quad y_p = M_p^{-1} \mod q = p^{-1} \mod q, \end{aligned}$$

Example (RSA signature computation)

$$p = 5, \quad q = 7, \quad n = 35, \quad \varphi(n) = 24, \quad e = 5, \quad d = 5.$$

To sign message m = 10, with CRT-based RSA implementation, Alice computes

$$s_p =?$$
 $s_q =?$ $y_p =?$ $y_q =?$

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Example (RSA signature computation)

$$p = 5, \quad q = 7, \quad n = 35, \quad \varphi(n) = 24, \quad e = 5, \quad d = 5.$$

To sign message m = 10, with CRT-based RSA implementation, Alice computes

$$s_p = m^{d \mod (p-1)} \mod p = 10^{5 \mod 4} \mod 5 = 0,$$

$$s_q = m^{d \mod (q-1)} \mod q = 10^{5 \mod 6} \mod 7 = 5.$$

By the extended Euclidean algorithm

$$7 = 5 + 2, \ 5 = 2 \times 2 + 1 \Longrightarrow 1 = 5 - 2 \times (7 - 5) = 5 \times 3 - 2 \times 7$$

We have

$$y_p = p^{-1} \mod q = 3 \mod 7,$$

 $y_q = q^{-1} \mod p = -2 \mod 5 = 3.$

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Gauss's algorithm

 $x = x_p y_q q + x_q y_p p \mod n$

Example (RSA signature computation)

$$p = 5, \quad q = 7, \quad n = 35, \quad \varphi(n) = 24, \quad e = 5, \quad d = 5.$$

With CRT-based RSA implementation, Alice computes

$$s_p = 0$$
 $s_q = 5$ $y_p = 3$ $y_q = 3$.

By Gauss's algorithm

$$s = ?$$

Gauss's algorithm

 $x = x_p y_q q + x_q y_p p \mod n$

Example (RSA signature computation)

 $p = 5, \quad q = 7, \quad n = 35, \quad \varphi(n) = 24, \quad e = 5, \quad d = 5.$

With CRT-based RSA implementation, Alice computes

 $s_p = 0$ $s_q = 5$ $y_p = 3$ $y_q = 3$.

By Gauss's algorithm

$$s = s_p y_q q + s_q y_p p \mod n = 5 \times 3 \times 5 \mod 35 = 5.$$

Garner's algorithm

$$x = x_p + ((x_q - x_p)y_p \mod q)p.$$

Example (RSA signature computation)

$$p = 5, \quad q = 7, \quad n = 35, \quad \varphi(n) = 24, \quad e = 5, \quad d = 5.$$

With CRT-based RSA implementation, Alice computes

$$s_p = 0$$
 $s_q = 5$ $y_p = 3$ $y_q = 3.$

By Garner's algorithm

$$s = ?$$

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Garner's algorithm

$$x = x_p + ((x_q - x_p)y_p \mod q)p.$$

Example (RSA signature computation)

$$p = 5, \quad q = 7, \quad n = 35, \quad \varphi(n) = 24, \quad e = 5, \quad d = 5.$$

With CRT-based RSA implementation, Alice computes

$$s_p = 0$$
 $s_q = 5$ $y_p = 3$ $y_q = 3$.

By Garner's algorithm

$$s = s_p + ((s_q - s_p)y_p \mod q)p = 0 + (5 \times 3 \mod 7) \times 5 = 1 \times 5 = 5.$$

CRT-based RSA implementation

$$\begin{aligned} x_p &:= a^{d \mod (p-1)} \mod p, \qquad x_q := a^{d \mod (q-1)} \mod q, \\ M_q &= q, \quad M_p = p, \\ y_q &= M_q^{-1} \mod p = q^{-1} \mod p, \quad y_p = M_p^{-1} \mod q = p^{-1} \mod q, \end{aligned}$$

Example

$$p = 29, \quad q = 41, \quad n = 1189, \quad \varphi(n) = 1120, \quad e = 3, \quad d = 747, \quad c = 8$$

With CRT-based RSA implementation, Bob computes

$$m_p =?$$
 $m_q =?$ $y_p =?$ $y_q =?$

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Example

 $p = 29, \quad q = 41, \quad n = 1189, \quad \varphi(n) = 1120, \quad e = 3, \quad d = 747, \quad c = 8$

With CRT-based RSA implementation, Bob computes

$$\begin{array}{rcl} m_p &=& c^{d \mod (p-1)} \mod p = 8^{747 \mod 28} \mod 29 = 8^{19} \mod 29 = 2, \\ m_q &=& c^{d \mod (q-1)} \mod q = 8^{747 \mod 40} \mod 41 = 8^{27} \mod 41 = 2. \end{array}$$

By the extended Euclidean algorithm

 $\begin{array}{rcl} 41 = 29 + 12, \ 29 = 12 \times 2 + 5, \ 12 = 5 \times 2 + 2, \ 5 = 2 \times 2 + 1, \\ 1 & = & 5 - 2 \times (12 - 5 \times 2) = -2 \times 12 + (29 - 12 \times 2) \times 5 \\ & = & 29 \times 5 - 12 \times (41 - 29) = -41 \times 12 + 29 \times 17. \\ y_p & = & p^{-1} \bmod q = 29^{-1} \bmod 41 = 17 \bmod 41, \\ y_q & = & q^{-1} \bmod p = 41^{-1} \bmod 29 = -12 \bmod 29 = 17 \bmod 29. \end{array}$

Gauss's algorithm

 $x = x_p y_q q + x_q y_p p \mod n$

Example

$$p = 29, \quad q = 41, \quad n = 1189, \quad \varphi(n) = 1120, \quad e = 3, \quad d = 747, \quad c = 8$$

With CRT-based RSA implementation, Bob computes

$$m_p = 2$$
 $m_q = 2$ $y_p = 17$ $y_q = 17$

By Gauss's algorithm

$$m = ?$$

Gauss's algorithm

 $x = x_p y_q q + x_q y_p p \mod n$

Example

 $p = 29, \quad q = 41, \quad n = 1189, \quad \varphi(n) = 1120, \quad e = 3, \quad d = 747, \quad c = 8$

With CRT-based RSA implementation, Bob computes

$$m_p = 2 \quad m_q = 2 \quad y_p = 17 \quad y_q = 17$$

By Gauss's algorithm

 $m = m_p y_q q + m_q y_p p \mod n = 2 \times 17 \times 41 + 2 \times 17 \times 29 \mod 1189 = 2380 \mod 1189 = 2.$

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Garner's algorithm

$$x = x_p + ((x_q - x_p)y_p \mod q)p.$$

Example

$$p = 29, \quad q = 41, \quad n = 1189, \quad \varphi(n) = 1120, \quad e = 3, \quad d = 747, \quad c = 8$$

With CRT-based RSA implementation, Bob computes

$$m_p = 2$$
 $m_q = 2$ $y_p = 17$ $y_q = 17$

By Garner's algorithm

$$m = ?$$

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Garner's algorithm

$$x = x_p + ((x_q - x_p)y_p \mod q)p.$$

Example

$$p = 29, \quad q = 41, \quad n = 1189, \quad \varphi(n) = 1120, \quad e = 3, \quad d = 747, \quad c = 8$$

With CRT-based RSA implementation, Bob computes

$$m_p = 2$$
 $m_q = 2$ $y_p = 17$ $y_q = 17$

By Garner's algorithm

$$m = m_p + ((m_q - m_p)y_p \mod q)p = 2 + 0 = 2.$$

CRT-based RSA implementation

- y_p and y_q can be precomputed, which saves time during communication.
- The intermediate values during the computation are only half as big compared to computations of $a^d \mod n$ since they are in \mathbb{Z}_p or \mathbb{Z}_q rather than \mathbb{Z}_n .
- $x_p = a^{d \mod (p-1)} \mod p$ and $x_q = a^{d \mod (q-1)} \mod q$ can be calculated by square and multiply algorithm to further improve the efficiency.
- $d \mod (p-1)$ and $d \mod (q-1)$ are much smaller than d, computing x_p or x_q requires fewer multiplications than computing $a^d \mod p$ and $a^d \mod q$.
- Compared to Gauss's algorithm, Garner's algorithm does not require the final modulo n reduction.

RSA, RSA signatures, and their implementations

- Introduction
- RSA
- RSA Signatures
- Implementations of Modular Exponentiation
- Implementations of Modular Multiplication

Modular operations

- To have more efficient modular exponentiation implementations, we need to compute modular addition, subtraction, inverse, and multiplications.
- For modular addition and subtraction, we can just compute the corresponding integer operation and then perform a single reduction modulo the modulus.
- For inverse modulo an integer, as has been mentioned a few times, we can utilize the extended Euclidean algorithm.
- We will look at one method for computing modular multiplication

Notations

• n: an integer of bit length ℓ_n ,

$$2^{\ell_n - 1} \le n < 2^{\ell_n}.$$

- $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, in particular, $0 \le a, b < n$.
- ω : the computer's word size
 - for a 64-bit processor, the word size is 64
- Let $\kappa = \lceil \ell_n / \omega \rceil$, i.e. $(\kappa 1)\omega < \ell_n \le \kappa \omega$.
- Then (|| indicates concatenation, $0 \le a_i < 2^\omega$)

$$a = a_{\kappa-1} ||a_{\kappa-2}|| \dots ||a_0,$$

• Note that some a_i might be 0 if the bit length of a is less than ℓ_n . We have

$$a = \sum_{i=0}^{\kappa-1} a_i (2^{\omega})^i.$$

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Notations

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Example

 $\omega = 2$, $a = 13 = 1101_2$, n = 15. Then

$$\ell_n = 4, \quad \kappa = \lceil \ell_n / \omega \rceil = \lceil 4/2 \rceil = 2.$$

Notations - Example

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Example

 $\omega=2\text{, }a=13=1101_2\text{, }n=15.$ Then $\ell_n=4\text{, }\kappa=2.$

 $a_0 = 01_2 = 1$, $a_1 = 11_2 = 3$, $a = a_0(2^{\omega})^0 + a_1(2^{\omega})^1 = 1 + 3 \times 4 = 13$

Notations – Example

- n: an integer of bit length ℓ_n
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$$a = \sum_{i=0}^{\kappa-1} a_i (2^{\omega})^i.$$

Example

$$a = 55 = 110111_2$$
, $n = 69$, $\omega = 2$.

$$\ell_n = ? \quad \kappa = \lceil \ell_n / \omega \rceil = ?$$

Notations – Example

- n: an integer of bit length ℓ_n
- $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, in particular, $0 \le a, b < n$.
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$$a = \sum_{i=0}^{\kappa-1} a_i (2^{\omega})^i.$$

Example

 $a = 55 = 110111_2$, n = 69, and $\omega = 2$.

$$a_n = 7, \quad \kappa = \lceil \ell_n / \omega \rceil = \lceil 7/2 \rceil = 4.$$

 $a_0 = ? \quad a_1 = ? \quad a_2 = ? \quad a_3 = ?$

Notations – Example

- n: an integer of bit length ℓ_n , i.e.
- $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, in particular, $0 \le a, b < n$.
- Let $\kappa = \lceil \ell_n / \omega \rceil$
- Then (|| indicates concatenation, $0 \le a_i < 2^{\omega}$)

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Example

$$a = 55 = 110111_2$$
, $n = 69$, $\omega = 2$. $\ell_n = 7$, $\kappa = \lceil \ell_n / \omega \rceil = \lceil 7/2 \rceil = 4$.

$$a_0 = 11 = 3, \quad a_1 = 01 = 1, \quad a_2 = 11 = 3, \quad a_3 = 0.$$

 $a = 3 \times (2^2)^0 + 1 \times (2^2)^1 + 3 \times (2^2)^2 + 0 \times (2^2)^3 = 3 + 4 + 48 + 0 = 55.$

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Blakley's method

• We would like to compute

$$R := ab \mod n, \quad a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_n.$$

• We have discussed that

$$a = \sum_{i=0}^{\kappa-1} a_i (2^{\omega})^i,$$

where $0 \leq a_i < 2^{\omega}$.

• The product *ab* can be computed as follows

$$t = ab = \left(\sum_{i=0}^{\kappa-1} a_i (2^{\omega})^i\right) b = \sum_{i=0}^{\kappa-1} (2^{\omega})^i a_i b,$$

Algorithm 3: Blakely's method for computing modular multiplication.

Input: $n, a, b// n \in \mathbb{Z}, n \geq 2$ has bit length ℓ_n ; $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ **Output:** $R = ab \mod n$

1 R = 0

// $\kappa = \lceil \ell_n / \omega \rceil$, where ω is the word size of the computer

- **2** for $i = \kappa 1$, $i \ge 0$, i - do
- $\begin{array}{c|c} \mathbf{3} & R = 2^{\omega}R + a_i b \\ \mathbf{4} & R = R \mod n \end{array}$

5 return R

Blakely's method

Input: n, a, bOutput: $R = ab \mod n$ 1 R = 02 for $i = \kappa - 1, i \ge 0, i - - do$ 3 $\begin{vmatrix} R = 2^{\omega}R + a_ib \\ R = R \mod n \end{vmatrix}$ 5 return R Line 3,

 $R \le 2^{\omega}(n-1) + (2^{\omega}-1)(n-1) = (2^{\omega+1}-1)n - (2^{\omega+1}-1)n - (2^{\omega+1}-1)n - (2^{\omega+1}-1)n - (2^{\omega}-1)n -$

Line 4 can be replaced by comparing R with n for $2^{\omega+1}-2$ times and subtract n from R in case $R\geq n$:

ι for
$$j=0,1,2\ldots,2^{\omega+1}-2$$
 do

2 | if
$$R \ge n$$
 then $R = R - n$

3 else break

in this way, we can avoid dividing by n
Input: n, a, b Output: $R = ab \mod n$ 1 R = 02 for $i = \kappa - 1$, $i \ge 0$, i - -do3 $\begin{vmatrix} R = 2^{\omega}R + a_ib \\ R = R \mod n \end{vmatrix}$ 5 return R

Example

 $\omega = 2, a = 13 = 1101_2, b = 5, n = 15 \ (\ell_n = 4), \kappa = 2.$

$$a_0 = 01_2 = 1, \quad a_1 = 11_2 = 3$$

For i = 1,

 $R = 0 + 3 \times 5 \mod 15 = 0 \mod 15.$

For
$$i = 0$$
, $R = ?$

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Input: n, a, b Output: $R = ab \mod n$ 1 R = 02 for $i = \kappa - 1$, $i \ge 0$, i - -do3 $\begin{bmatrix} R = 2^{\omega}R + a_ib \\ R = R \mod n \end{bmatrix}$ 5 return R

Example

$$\omega = 2, a = 13 = 1101_2, b = 5, n = 15 \ (\ell_n = 4)$$

 $\kappa = 2.$
 $a_0 = 01_2 = 1, a_1 = 11_2 = 3.$
For $i = 1$,
 $R = 0 + 3 \times 5 \mod 15 = 0 \mod 15.$
For $i = 0$,
 $R = 0 + 1 \times 5 \mod 15 = 5 \mod 15$
We have the final result $13 \times 5 \mod 15 = 5.$

Input: n, a, b Output: $R = ab \mod n$ 1 R = 02 for $i = \kappa - 1$, $i \ge 0$, i - -do3 $\begin{bmatrix} R = 2^{\omega}R + a_ib \\ R = R \mod n \end{bmatrix}$ 5 return R

Example

Input: n, a, b Output: $R = ab \mod n$ 1 R = 02 for $i = \kappa - 1$, $i \ge 0$, i - -do3 $\begin{vmatrix} R = 2^{\omega}R + a_ib \\ R = R \mod n \end{vmatrix}$ 5 return R

Example

$$a = 55 = 110111_2, b = 46, n = 69, \omega = 2, \ell_n = 7, \\ \kappa = 4, a_0 = 11 = 3, a_1 = 01 = 1, a_2 = 11 = 3, \\ a_3 = 0$$

i = 3 line 3, R = 0, line 4, R = 0, i = 2 line 3, R = ?line 4, R = ?

Input: n, a, bOutput: $R = ab \mod n$ 1 R = 02 for $i = \kappa - 1, i \ge 0, i - - do$ 3 $\begin{vmatrix} R = 2^{\omega}R + a_ib \\ R = R \mod n \end{vmatrix}$ 5 return R

Example

- $\begin{array}{l} a=55=110111_2,\,b=46,\,n=69,\,\omega=2,\,\ell_n=7,\\ \kappa=4,\,a_0=11=3,\,a_1=01=1,\,a_2=11=3,\\ a_3=0 \end{array}$
 - i = 3 line 3, R = 0, line 4. R = 0. i = 2 line 3. $R = 3 \times 46 = 138$. line 4, $R = 138 \mod 69 = 0$, i = 1line 3. R = ?line 4. R = ?i=0 line 3. R=?line 4. R = ?

Input: n, a, b Output: $R = ab \mod n$ 1 R = 02 for $i = \kappa - 1$, $i \ge 0$, i - -do3 $\begin{vmatrix} R = 2^{\omega}R + a_ib \\ R = R \mod n \end{vmatrix}$ 5 return R

Example

- $a = 55 = 110111_2, b = 46, n = 69, \omega = 2, \ell_n = 7, \\ \kappa = 4, a_0 = 11 = 3, a_1 = 01 = 1, a_2 = 11 = 3, \\ a_3 = 0$
 - i=3 line 3, R=0,
 - line 4, R = 0,

$$i = 2$$
 line 3, $R = 3 \times 46 = 138$,

line 4,
$$R = 138 \mod 69 = 0$$
,

$$i = 1$$
 line 3, $R = 1 \times 46 = 46$,

ine 4,
$$R = 46 \mod 69 = 46$$
,

$$i = 0$$
 line 3, $R = 2^2 \times 46 + 3 \times 46 = 322$,

line 4, $R = 322 \mod 69 = 46$.

Final remarks

- Currently, a few hundred qubits (a quantum counterpart to the classical bit) are possible for a quantum computer
- To break RSA, thousands of qubits are required.
- Post-quantum public key cryptosystems are being proposed to protect communications after a sufficiently strong quantum computer is built.
- Various public key cryptosystems based on different problems
- Various digital signature designs
- Provable secure signature, similarity to one-time pad